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Introduction
The first two decades of the twenty-first century have witnessed the flourishing of
economies in the Global South. After the stormy 1990s when economies in Asia and
Latin America were struck by financial crises, countries in both regions have steadily
grown, demonstrating strong resilience during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).
Emerging economies are no longer the needy clients of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) that now looks for new ‘clients’ elsewhere.
In contrast to the ‘one-model-fits-all’ approach of IMF programs in the 1990s,
the transition from a state in crisis to a flourishing state has been achieved through
different paths where each country adopted its own tailored model. In their relations
with the IMF, the situation of these countries has changed since the Asian Financial
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Crisis of 1997–98 (AFC). Developing countries have implemented diverse strategies to
reduce their dependency on IMF financial assistance. Simultaneously, and with a sound
financial position at home, emerging economies now seek greater influence in the
global financial order, not only claiming a more influential voice in traditional forums
but also proposing new initiatives.
Due to the new reality, questions arise as to the consequences of this reaccommodation for the IMF and whether the rising contribution of developing countries
to the global economy will be accompanied by a concomitant increase in their influence
on the global order that will, in turn, be reflected in the practice of Law and
Development. Whereas this is a field that has been highly influenced by the debate on
the meaning of ‘development’ and the provision of development assistance, this article
limits its scope to critically reviews the strategies implemented by developing countries
to reduce their dependence on IMF financial assistance as well as to build a more
inclusive and pluralistic global financial order.
The article observes that the strong resurgence of emerging economies has not
been accompanied by an equivalent rebalance in the influence of these economies in
international forums, including the IMF whose governance reform package has not yet
entered into force due to the lack of support from the United States. In spite of the long
way ahead, developing countries have become more assertive on the international stage
and have launched new alternatives. This new reality should contribute with the
definition of a more pluralistic agenda for Law and Development.
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Law and Development prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)
For decades, academics have studied the interaction between legal institutions and
development, leading to the creation of a body of knowledge that has been known as
‘Law and Development’. Trubek and Santos, and Ohnesorge define it as a field that
focuses on the socio-economic role of law in supporting development. 1 It is influenced
by disciplines such as economic theory, development theory, and politics as well as the
policies and practices of development organisations and international financial
institutions (IFIs). Since its inception, Law and Development has been tied to the
financial and development assistance provided by national development agencies and
IFIs and it has been influenced by the debate on what ‘development’ means. Trubek and
Santos divide the history of Law and Development into three phases.2 The following
paragraphs briefly review these three ‘moments’.
The seminal work of Max Weber and the theory of modernisation contributed to
the genesis of the first Law and Development movement. For Weber, a modern
economy required a predictable legal system, ‘the functioning of which is calculable in
accordance with rational rules.’3 Only the West, Weber argued, experienced a complete
development of its legal system that was systematically elaborated and separated from
other non-legal norms. The development and maintenance of this ‘rational order,’
Weber argues, has been managed by people who have received legal training.
Furthermore, the process used (and continues to use) deductive and rational methods
very different from customary-normative systems. Weber concludes that it is thanks to
this progress of law that capitalist economies involved gained the stability they needed
to flourish. For this author, only countries with ‘legal rationality’ were capable of
achieving full industrialisation.4
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The initial Law and Development movement was primarily conceived in the
Unites States, and was closely related to the American government’s foreign aid policy
provided during the 1960s to assist developing countries in Latin America and Africa.
This school of thought proposed the use of ‘modern law’ as an instrument to achieve
social change. For the proponents of Law and Development, modern law was uniform,
transactional, purposive, universal, hierarchical, rational and professional.5 During this
first ‘moment’, Law and Development proponents suggested developing countries
should undertake legal reforms to adopt modern law. This law was the opposite of the
‘customary law’ and ‘traditional’ institutions that were, it was argued, unsuitable to the
achievement of progress.6 Based on these principles, the efforts of the Law and
Development movement were oriented towards modernising traditional societies by
transplanting legal models from developed nations. The state, assisted by foreign donors,
would have a predominant role at this stage in the management of the modernisation
process.
In a 1972 article, Trubek criticised what he called the ‘core conception of
modern law.’7 He argued that it was erroneously assumed that Western law was
essential for development. Trubek claimed that the core conception devoted too much
effort to the implementation of Western law in developing countries, instead of
understanding the legal systems of those nations. Two years later, Trubek and
Galanter’s article, ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement’,8 declared a crisis in Law and
Development studies. Both authors criticised the ‘liberal legalism’ paradigm that was
the basis of the initial Law and Development movement.
The Law and Development debate was revived during the 1980s, aided by the
theory of institutional changes and the work of Douglass North. This author affirms that
institutions matter and are an important determinant of the long-term performance of
4

economies because they have an effect on the cost of exchange and production.9 For this
author, ‘[t]he inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of
contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary
underdevelopment in the Third World’.10 IFIs started to design a new strategy on the
grounds of his work, emphasising the importance of the rule of law to a market economy
and for achieving development.11 The IMF followed this path and became involved with
the ex-Soviet republics, assisting them in building a legal and institutional framework
for a market economy.12 A similar strategy of strengthening legal institutions to open
closed economies was also promoted by the IMF in Latin American, Asia and Africa.13
The second ‘moment’ in Law and Development was inspired by neo-liberal
economic theories and was primarily focused on strengthening legislation and
institutions associated with business, foreign investment and the private sector.14 It was
believed that economic reforms and the improvement of economic growth would
automatically spread to other aspects of development. As a consequence, developing
countries were convinced by IFIs (including the IMF) to implement standardised legal
and economic reforms as a condition for receiving financial aid that would help to
address financial crises. Changes were inspired by ‘best practices’ as had been applied
in developed nations.15 Typical IFI programs focused on areas such as legislation
required to support trade and foreign investment, banks, liberalisation of financial
markets, protection of intellectual property, improvement of courts, and creation of
alternative dispute resolution schemes. The main criticism of the neo-liberal rule of law
was its excessive market fundamentalism and the importance placed on the
transplantation into developing countries of legislation inspired by norms enforced in
developed nations without considering the economic, cultural and social context of the
recipient country.
5

In this second wave, some efforts were directed to discuss the relevance of the
rule of law not only to achieving economic development but also to promoting
democracy and human rights; however, the debate was dominated by the former and,
for example, greater emphasis was given to the protection of economic rights. Similarly
to the first wave of Law and Development, the neo-liberal rule of law relied heavily on
models designed in forums controlled by major industrialised countries with little or no
consideration of the domestic context of the developing countries into which the models
were to be transplanted. In this moment, the focus of Law and Development changed
from formal law to a thin notion of rule of law that was used to convince the South of
the importance of adopting market legal institutions to achieve development.16
During this second moment, research by a group of scholars who had been
working on East Asia became more visible. Their research revealed that various
countries demonstrated a successful economic development record that was not being
supported by a formal rule of law context. This line of research — referred to by Scott
Newton as the ‘Second Commonwealth School’ — aims to understand the role played
by law in the successful development of East Asia. It assumes a more holistic approach
and studies law in the social and cultural context of each country.17
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the rule of law maintained a crucial
role in IFI development strategies; however, international institutions tried to reduce the
influence of neo-liberalism in favour of other elements embraced in the concept of
development. In this third stage, which coincided with the launch of the Comprehensive
Development Framework by the World Bank, the rule of law seemed to be a mechanism
through which to guarantee the openness of markets, the protection of human rights and
the promotion of democracy. In other words, while the doctrinal position of the third
moment still supported neo-liberalism and the strengthening of private law, it also
6

recognised the need for the construction of a more comprehensive legal framework
which would encompass not only the protection of rights associated with the economy,
but also other ‘universal principles’. Using this approach, IFIs started to promote
reforms oriented towards strengthening a notion of rule of law that would serve as a
pillar for the promotion of human rights and democracy as well as of the market.
The World Bank and the IMF subscribed to the new approach, calling for the
promotion of the comprehensive model of development that addressed not only
economic development but also the social, political, human and legal perspectives of the
process.18 Within this broader concept of development, the IMF created the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999 (replacing the Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility) in order to connect its financial objectives with the goal of
reducing poverty. For this reason, the IMF’s lending operations accommodated higher
public expenditure directed at tackling poverty.19
The adoption of a broader notion of the rule of law in the third moment and the
acceptance of a more comprehensive understanding of the concept of development have
contributed to expanding the field of Law and Development. The main features of the
third moment are the inclusion of the human rights debate in the context of Law and
Development at a similar level to the economic factor. Rather than waiting for
economic reforms to permeate other spheres, the third moment tries to address the rule
of law from different perspectives (e.g. economic, human rights, etc.). This reality has
increased the number of new actors that have joined the conversation, reducing the
influence of traditional IFIs that dominated the debate during the two initial moments.20
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Rebalancing the global financial order
As was briefly explained in the previous part, the IMF and other IFIs were key players in
the promotion of the agenda of Law and Development between the 1980s and the
beginning of the 2000s. From 2005, they have had a more modest influence whilst
middle-income countries have strengthened their financial position and steadily
increased development cooperation assistance to other less developed countries. This
South-South cooperation has been promoted without a clear agenda for Law and
Development, just as it had been in the case with IFIs in previous past decades. Thus, it
is open to discussion whether a fourth moment of Law and Development has emerged.
The novel switch in power relations was a response to various factors; however, an
element common to many developing countries was the discontent produced by the IMF
programs in the 1990s. Resentment towards IMF programs encouraged these nations to
explore means to reduce IMF interference in domestic affairs.
When developing countries started implementing various mechanisms to
diminish IMF influence, the approach negatively affected the institution. Few people
remember the critical situation in which the IMF was immersed prior to the onset of the
GFC. It was facing its own crisis, trying to survive financially and rebuild a reputation
that had been damaged by its management of financial crises in Latin America and Asia
where IMF-sponsored reforms inflamed residents of cities from Ciudad de Mexico to
Buenos Aires and from Seoul to Bangkok. It was common to see widely-broadcast
events where a humiliated president or prime minister — who had been basically rushed
to agree on the implementation of an IMF-sponsored program — was shown with a
smiling IMF Managing Director, signing a Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), accepting the
adoption of the IMF ‘recipe’ in exchange for financial assistance.21
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Under these SBAs (which the IMF Guidelines on Conditionality stated were not
legal agreements),22 countries had to adopt a neo-liberal program that embraced the set
of prescriptions included in the so-called Washington Consensus. Measures to be
adopted included fiscal discipline, re-ordering public expenditure priorities (away from
subsidies), tax reform, financial liberalisation, unified exchange rates, trade
liberalisation, liberalisation of foreign direct investment, privatisation of state
enterprises, deregulation, and protection of property rights.23 The key strategy of the
neoliberal recipe was ‘less government intervention, more freedom in the market’.24 The
formula would, it was widely believed by post-Keynesian economists and advisers,
bring prosperity and development to poorer countries. Despite such ostensibly good
intentions, the implementation of IMF programs in many cases exacerbated the
consequences of crises and increased social and economic instability as well as
inequality.25
Due to the negative social, political and economic impact of IMF programs,
discontent with the IMF grew, prompting developing nations to think of ways to reduce
IMF ascendancy in their regions. It would be beyond the bounds of the present article to
explain in detail each of the mechanisms deployed by developing countries to regain
control of their domestic financial affairs; however, the author will review four of the
mechanisms supported by the Global South (below).

International reserves
One of the first measures put in place by developing countries to reduce IMF influence
was the accumulation of international reserves. Should financial crises arise, these
resources would serve as the first line of defence and provide the necessary liquidity for
nations affected instead of those nations applying for IMF financial assistance. Most
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countries took advantage of favourable financial market conditions to accomplish this.
In the case of China, reserves increased from USD24.8 billion to USD3.3 trillion
between 1992 and 2012.26 In the same period, Asian countries such as India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand amassed a total of USD1.1 trillion in
2012, up from USD82.7 billion in 1992. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico
and Peru raised their reserves from USD75 billion in 1992 to 726 billion in 2012. This
invaluable reserve position helped emerging economies to ‘surf’ the GFC in an enviable
position and without requiring the assistance of the IMF.27

Repayment of IMF loans
A significant number of middle-income countries experimented with the
implementation of IMF sponsored programs and did not achieve the anticipated positive
macro-economic results or strengthened governance and a legal framework for the
smooth operation of markets. Some were also the biggest IMF debtors and decided to
anticipate payment of their debts in the 2000s to escape its strict conditionality and
regain control of their domestic financial affairs. In the words of former Argentinean
President Nestor Kirchner, ‘Paying off the Fund will generate freedom for national
decisions.’28 By 2006, countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela had
repaid their loans to the IMF. Hugo Chávez, then the Venezuelan president, announced
that Venezuela would withdraw from the Institution. Chávez, however, encountered
some practical problems in regard to pursuing this course because withdrawal from the
IMF was considered a default event under the terms of many of the bonds issued and
sold by the country’s government in international markets.29
Altogether, between 2004 and 2008, Latin America and the Caribbean’s
dependence on the IMF plummeted — outstanding loans from the General Reserve

10

Account fell from 49.4% of the IMF’s SDR62.153 billion loan portfolio to 6.7% of the
IMF’s SDR3.896 billion of outstanding loans (i.e. from SDR30.697 billion to about
SDR395 million).30
Debtor repayments and the relatively good health of the economies of middleincome countries that did not require bailouts from the IMF in the period produced a
dramatic reduction in IMF income (necessary to cover its operating expenditure).31
Credit outstanding of its General Reserve Account fell from a peak of SDR60. 451
billion in December 1998 to SDR6.036 billion in December 2007.32 This prompted a
debate about its future and financial viability.33
One of the outcomes of this debate was that the IMF decided that it needed to
rethink its operations and adopt a new income model that included the sale of a portion
of its gold reserves, expansion of investment strategies to generate higher returns, and
reinstatement of the practice of recovering costs that the IMF incurs in the operations of
the trust fund for concessional lending to low-income countries by reimbursing the
General Resource Account for these costs.34 The IMF also decided to reduce its
bureaucracy.
Paradoxically, the GFC provided the IMF with an ‘unexpected’ opportunity to
recover from the reduction of income with the arrival of new European ‘clients’ affected
by the GFC.35 Its total credit outstanding portfolio rose to SDR21. 487 billion by
December 2008 from SDR9. 833 billion a year earlier, further increasing to a peak of
SDR95.808 billion in December 2012.36 Nonetheless, it is difficult to find a Latin
American or Asian middle-income country among current IMF debtors. Pakistan is the
only Asian country that has a current arrangement with the institution funded by the
General Reserve Account and Bangladesh has a facility supported by the Poverty
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Reduction and Growth Trust (Table 1). Colombia, Mexico and Honduras have current
arrangements with the IMF but they have not withdrawn money from those facilities.
Reforms of IMF governance and the role of the new G20
As developing countries became more financially sound, they started demanding
reforms of IMF’s governance in order to achieve greater transparency in the design of
policies and programs. The IMF viewed these claims as an opportunity to attract money
from emerging economies with large international reserves; the increase of emerging
economies’ quotas would boost IMF’s resources available to address financial crises.
To capture the support of middle-income countries, the IMF agreed to review several
policies, including the allocation of quotas among members in order to increase
developing nations’ voting power.
After lengthy negotiations, in 2005 IMF members achieved an initial agreement
to implement a new policy of quota allocation that began to be implemented in 2008
with an ad-hoc quota increase for 54 members. Then, in 2010, the members agreed upon
a set of reforms contained in the 14th General Review of Quotas that introduces a
historic doubling of quotas and a major realignment of quota-shares that involves a shift
of more than 6% from over-represented to under-represented members and more than
6% quota shift to developing countries.37 The greatest beneficiaries of these changes
would be among emerging economies. In the particular case of China, its IMF quota
would rise from 2% to 6.4%. Another innovative reform approved was to move to a
more representative Executive Board with all members elected to the Board.
The 14th General Review of Quotas reform involves an amendment to the IMF
Articles of the Agreement.38 For the amendment to come into effect, it needs acceptance
by at least three-fifths of IMF members, representing 85% of the total voting power
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(Article XXVIII). Members agreed that they would make their best efforts to complete
their domestic approval processes by October 2012; however, the amendment has not
entered into force at August 2015.
These reforms — known as ‘the voice and participation reforms’ — represent a
step in the right direction to strengthening the participation of developing countries in
IMF governance; however, it does not significantly change the way in which the IMF
makes its decisions. When the reforms enter in force, almost 47% of IMF voting power
will be still controlled by nine developed countries, and the US vote (17%) will be still
needed to pass important decisions where a qualified vote of 85% is required, including
the implementation of the new SDR quota system and the reform of the Executive
Board (Table 2).39 An example of the difficulties faced by members’ attempts to give
developing countries more voice is the fact that these reforms have not come into effect
as the US Congress has not approved the proposed changes, although the vast majority
of the IMF members have already accepted the proposed SDR quotas (members
representing 77% of the total voting powers) and the reform of the Executive Board
(members representing 80% of the voting powers).40
At the same time that the IMF was working on strengthening the voting share of
developing countries in 2008, major industrialised economies decided to implement
another strategy to retain control of the Institution and of the global financial order in
general. That year, the importance of the G20 was significantly altered. Initially formed
in 1999 during the AFC by the G7 finance ministers (in the face of some opposition
from the IMF which not unreasonably viewed it as a rival) and meeting at least annually
thereafter, these meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors attempted to
move to this forum the relevant discussions on policies, programs and key decisions.41
Its status markedly increased when, as the GFC began to impact on an increasing
13

number of national economies, G20 ‘Summits’ (heads of government meetings) were
held in addition to G20 meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors. The
G20 became more widely accepted (even within the IMF) as an avenue for the making
of decisions and the formulation of policies to be adopted by the IMF to deal with the
rolling crises.42
This group defines itself as ‘the premier forum for international economic
cooperation.’43 The G20 represents countries responsible for 85% of the global
economy and includes developed countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, South Korea, Turkey, UK and US), and emerging nations (Argentina, Brazil,
China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa). The European
Union is also a member of the G20.
The pragmatic implication of the strengthening of the G20 is that this plurilateral
forum has divided developing countries into two groups: the first formed by those
emerging markets that are ranked within the biggest global economies and are
represented in the G20; and the second, that of developing countries whose economies
contribute less than 15% of the global input and are represented in the IMF but not in
the G20.
The use of a plurilateral approach instead of multilateralism has become
common where major industrialised economies have found it difficult to negotiate
multilateral agreements in a way that accommodates their interests due to the
multiplicity of countries with vast and competing interests.44 In the case of the IMF, it
seems easier for developed countries to negotiate with ten emerging economies within
the context of the G20 rather than a greater number of IMF members; however, this
approach delegitimises smaller economies in both categories, muting their voices,
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concerns and contributions in the fundamental process of decision and policy making
and program design.
Regional forums
Another strategy employed by developing countries to reduce IMF influence has been
the organisation of regional forums that can be a more reliable and less intrusive source
of emergency funds in the event of financial crises. While major industrialised countries
have been willing to create plurilateral forums to group like-minded countries (e.g.,
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)) and to address regional problems (e.g.,
European Financial Stability Facility), they have opposed the use of similar strategies
by developing countries. In the aftermath of the AFC, for example, Japan suggested the
creation of an Asian monetary fund, a proposal that was opposed by the US Treasury
Department, which argued that such a regional fund would undermine the IMF by
lending money with inconsistent policy conditions.45 Consequently, the idea was
dismissed and the ASEAN members together with China, Japan and South Korea
agreed, under the Chiang Mai Initiative, to a bilateral system of currency swaps (rather
than a new regional financial institution) to assist nations affected by future crises.
Although initially the arrangement was thought to exclude any IMF
involvement, the final product, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM),
has been designed as an IMF supplementary mechanism. The CMIM is currently a
USD240 billion self-managed reserve pooling mechanism that provides short-term swap
facilities to countries in need.46 Each economy’s swap quota depends on its CMIM pool
contribution, its level of development, and size. If a country requests to use more than
30% of its CMIM quota, the transaction must be linked to an IMF program;47 thus, the
IMF has the capacity to influence conditionality for most of the swaps conducted under
this arrangement. This prevents circumstances arising where a country affected by a
15

financial crisis receives assistance from both sources (i.e. IMF and CMIM) under
conditions that may be contradictory. Whilst China and Japan each contributed with
32% of the CMIM funds, decisions on fundamental issues associated with the Initiative
must be approved by consensus which is a main difference with the IMF governance.
With less success than its Asian counterparts, South America has also sought
alternative options to face financial crises, avoiding the IMF. As early as 1976, Andean
member countries of the 1969 Cartagena Agreement on Andean Sub-regional
Integration (Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela) founded the Andean
Reserve Fund (Fondo Andino de Reservas (FAR)). In 1989, the FAR became the Latin
American Reserve Fund (Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (FLAR)) and tried to
attract members more widely from Latin America. This was met with very limited
success — only Costa Rica and Uruguay joined the Fund (in 2000 and 2009
respectively). FLAR’s low capital resources — USD2.3 billion — is the reason that its
role remained very limited, and why South American nations sought IMF financial
assistance in the 1990s instead.
Banco del Sur is a more recent initiative to build an alternative international
financial architecture in South America. This IFI was originally agreed upon by
Venezuela and Argentina in 2006,48 with Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay and
Uruguay joining subsequently. The complex negotiations to create the Bank took longer
than expected due to participants’ divergent perspectives on the functions that the new
IFI should assume. Countries such as Ecuador advocated the adoption of a more
ambitious model that created an alternative regional financial architecture that would
include Banco del Sur and Fondo del Sur, the latter a type of regional monetary fund,
while nations such as Brazil backed a more modest proposal that envisaged the Banco
del Sur providing only financial assistance for development.
16

The negotiating countries finally signed an agreement to create the new regional
institution in 2009. Banco del Sur possesses start-up capital of USD7 billion (USD20
billion pledged). Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela initially contributed with USD2
billion each; Ecuador and Paraguay USD400 million each; and Bolivia and Paraguay
USD100 million each. In spite of the uneven contributions, each member has one vote,
and decisions are made by a qualified majority in case of structural matters and major
financing projects decisions, and by a simple majority for other decisions on operational
matters.49 Banco del Sur has not started providing loans yet and it is unclear whether it
would incorporate conditions into its agreements; however, one of the goals of the Bank
is to offer financial instruments that are compatible with the economic and fiscal
policies of each beneficiary country; thus, it is unlikely that the institution will include
IMF-type of conditionality that affect national policies.
Some commentators have suggested that Banco del Sur is more a political
project than a serious and articulated financial response to future South American
crises.50 They argue that ideological differences among its members will impede
efficient operation. Others see the new regional institution as a welcome player that will
contribute fresh ideas to the development debate and serve as a counterbalance to the
influence of Western-controlled IFIs such as the IMF and the World Bank.51
Most recently, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS)52
established a far more ambitious project, the New Development Bank (NDB BRICS),
which is a development institution with capital of USD100 billion with each member
contributing with USD20 billion. (Initial capital was set at USD50 billion.)
Headquartered in Shanghai, the NDB BRICS will provide financing for infrastructure
and development. Different from the Bretton Woods institutions, each member of the
Bank has equal voting power. Additionally, the NDB BRICS will manage a
17

Contingency Reserve Arrangement of USD100 billion to assist countries to address
short-term liquidity problems. The pool will be funded with a contribution of USD41
billion from China, while Brazil, India and Russia will each contribute USD18 billion,
and South Africa USD5 billion.
The NDB BRICS represents another alternative for sourcing development
finance for developing countries. The Agreement establishing the NDB BRICS does not
contain references to fiscal o monetary conditions for transactions with non-member
countries but it grants the Board of Governors with powers to issue general policies
setting conditions under which those transactions can be conducted (Article 19).

Cooperation: South-North and South-South
Whilst Michel Camdessus, IMF Managing Director between 1987 and 2000, was an
unwelcome guest of many developing countries in the 1990s, Christine Lagarde, the
current head of the Institution, has been perceived more positively. Her role has been
quite different from the one undertaken by Camdessus when she toured Asia and Latin
America after the onset of the GFC, trying to encourage leaders of emerging economies
to financially contribute to the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), created to
deal with European countries affected by the GFC. The intervention of Lagarde was
fruitful, and countries such as Brazil and Indonesia pledged their support to the IMF and
the EFSF. In this scenario, emerging economies were involved in a cooperation that
could be labelled ‘South-North’. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that emerging
economies have moved from being recipients of IMF financial assistance to contributors
of funds to assist European countries in crisis, their influence over decisions that affect
the international financial system is still limited, as was noted above.
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Innovation is also perceptible in the field of development cooperation among
developing nations, with several middle-income countries having become influential
players alongside traditional actors.53 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
provided development assistance for the amount of USD3.9 billion in 2009, with China
accounting for 50% of that total.54 Whilst most traditional development and financial
programs sponsored by IFIs and members of the Development Assistance Committee of
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC)55 incorporated
conditionality that requires the implementation of fiscal, monetary and structural
measures aligned with the market-economy model, development cooperation procured
by nations of the South has proved popular due mainly to the exclusion of governance
and policy conditions.
China, for example, provides non-conditional financial assistance to countries in
Asia, Latin America and Africa. The Chinese government has developed its own set of
principles to guide the provision of foreign aid and they differ from those developed
under the DAC umbrella.56 Chinese in this area have described the country’s SouthSouth cooperation as collaboration among sovereign states to achieve mutual benefits.57
China’s financial assistance does not generally attach policy or governance
conditionality. The country considers itself as ‘developing’ too; thus, it assumes
development assistance is a mechanism that facilitates the exchange of development
experiences with other like-minded countries. China’s assistance has benefited 93
countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia. A recent study has estimated that, in 2011
alone, China made new commitments for foreign aid for an amount close to USD189.3
billion which was equivalent to about 3% of the country’s GDP.58 Other more
conservative studies estimate Chinese foreign aid in USD7 billion in 2013.59
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At the 2011 OECD Fourth High Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (South
Korea), IFIs and DAC countries initially tried to agree with emerging economies from
the BRICSAM group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Mexico) on a set
of unified principles that would guide the provision of financial assistance for
development.60 However, participants could not reach agreement, although they
supported the final declaration in which it was recognised that modalities and
responsibilities that apply to South‐South cooperation differ from those that apply to
North‐South cooperation.61 BRICSAM’s position was relevant, particularly for China
that (as was emphasized earlier) provides substantial financial development aid without
attaching conditions that are common in IFI sponsored programs. Consequently,
BRICSAM has not joined the aid effectiveness panel that was created in the Busan
meeting.62 The financial assistance offered by China could be considered as politically
and economically motivated. For many developing countries; however, it is as an
opportunity to access financial assistance in competitive terms without structural
conditionality.

The rise of emerging economies and the future of Law and Development
The expansion of development cooperation sources as well as the rising influence of
emerging economies has been reflected in the field of Law and Development. Different
from the precedent moments where the debate was highly influenced by IFIs and
wealthier developed countries, relying heavily on theoretical frameworks that originated
in Western universities and ‘think-tank’ institutions, the current moment reflects more
fairly the interest of developing countries.
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The Global South has assumed a more proactive role in the definition of
development cooperation and deciding how law should be interconnected with the
development process. The change can be perceived in the increase number of
collaborative projects that involve Western and developing-country institutions,
academics and practitioners. This collaboration is the source of new ideas that capture a
more accurate picture of each developing country and avoid the formulation of grandtheories.63 Instead of a debate focused on single developed nations IFI agenda, multiple
agendas with a more pluralistic content have arisen where several approaches compete
and non-traditional providers of development assistance offer alternative development
aid products.
In this pluralistic scenario, there is no a unique role for law. Whilst it is still
common to find academic studies influenced by the old schools of Law and
Development that advocates for the modernisation of law and the strengthening of the
rule of law, it is also becoming more familiar to find innovative perspectives that use
the law in different ways. A good example reviewed in this article is the way in which
developing countries are using a more equalitarian conception of international economic
law in forums such as Banco del Sur, the NDB BRICS and CMIM in order to build
more transparent and legitimate governance systems. This approach is a clear reaction
of the South to governance of traditional IFIs that uses economic and political power as
sole factors to allocate voting rights, concentrating the decision-making process in a
small group of countries.
On the other hand, the IMF remains unchanged. The onset of the GFC
overshadowed the debate on the future of the institution and its overdue governance
reform. The Global South responded to the slow process of IMF reforms by using a
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more assertive approach, creating innovative mechanisms for mutual development
cooperation as well as gestating new forums and institutions.
Although emerging economies still do not have a key role in the decisionmaking process of the international financial order, they are demonstrating political
maturity and the financial strength to explore new alternatives that do not necessarily
have to agree completely with US and European models. This reality does not mean that
emerging economies will completely depart from a market economic model or that they
will not support initiatives to strengthen the rule of law. They will continue to develop a
market-oriented economy and work on a concept of the rule of law in order to promote
democracy, human rights and a market economy but, contrary to the traditional IFI
approach, these nations will envisage methods and mechanisms that consider local
circumstances, experience and interests. In spite of the optimism of this article about the
future of Law and Development, other authors opt for a more cautious view and remind
us of the limits of law to support development and address the deep problems of
inequality still faced by many developing countries.64
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Table 1. IMF debtors in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean (May 2015)
Country

Type of
arrangement

Date of arrangement

Expiration Date

Amount Drawn
(SDR million)

April 2015

Amount
Approved
(SDR million)
639.9

Bangladesh

ECF

April 2012

Colombia

FCL

June 2013

June 2015

3,870

0.00

Honduras

Stand-by

December 2014

December 2017

77.70

0.00

Honduras

SCF

December 2014

December 2016

51.80

0.00

Mexico

FCL

November 2014

November 2016

47,292

0.00

Pakistan

EFF

September 2013

September 2016

4,393

2,520

ECF: Extended Credit Facility
EFF: Extended Fund Facility
FCL: Flexible Credit Line
SCF: Stand-by Credit Facility (low income countries)
Stan-by: Stand-by Arrangement
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457.1

Table 2. IMF quotas and share of world GDP
Country

IMF Quota (%)

World GDP share
(%)(a)

Current(b)

Projected(c)

DEVELOPED
ECONOMIES
Australia

1.4

1.4

2.1

Canada

2.7

2.3

2.5

France

4.5

4.2

3.6

Germany

6.1

5.6

4.7

Italy

3.3

3.2

2.8

Japan

6.6

6.5

8.2

Spain

1.7

2.0

1.8

UK

4.5

4.2

3.4

US

17.7

17.4

22.4

TOTAL

48.5

46.8

51.6

Brazil

1.8

2.3

3.1

China (d)

4.0

6.4

11.4

India

2.4

2.7

2.5

Mexico

1.5

1.9

1.6

Russia

2.5

2.7

2.8

South Africa

0.8

0.6

0.5

TOTAL

13

16.6

21.9

EMERGING ECONOMIES

(a) Based on the World Bank data available at

http://data.worldbank.org/data-

catalog/GDP-ranking-table
(b) International Monetary Fund, IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of
Governors (5 December 2014): as per the 2008 Amendment on Voice and Participation
(entry
into
effect
3
March
2011)

http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx
(c) These numbers represent the quota variations agreed upon by the 14th General Review of
Quotas to one decimal place: International Monetary Fund, Quota Formula — Data Update
and Further Considerations (IMF Policy Paper, August 2014) 7 ‘Table 1. Distribution of
Quotas and Calculated Quotas’ http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/070214.pdf
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(d)Includes People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong & Macao Special Administrative Regions:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pdfs/quota_tbl.pdf
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